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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ference might frustrate "the basic purpose of arbitration, which is to
dispose of disputes quickly and avoid the expense and delay of extended
court proceedings. 48 Although the action of the Court in Commonwealth
in vacating the arbitration award and imposing a rule requiring disclosure
on the arbitrator might at first glance appear to run counter to this ideal,
a closer analysis indicates that the contrary is more likely. Certainly it
was the aim of the Court, in formulating its rule requiring disclosure, to
minimize the judicial role in arbitration. The rule formulated by the
Court-that an arbitrator has a duty to disclose to the parties any deal-
ings that might create an impression of possible bias-should strengthen
the arbitration process and minimize judicial interference in at least two
ways. First, requiring disclosure should give the parties additional faith
in the fairness of the proceedings. Mr. Dooley advised: "Trust every-
body-but cut the cards.""0 A duty of disclosure is an additional "cut
of the cards" that should tend to lessen suspicions of a losing party that
he was treated unfairly. With this additional confidence in the settlement
process, the loser is less likely to take his complaint to the courts. Second,
the rule requiring disclosure will provide an easily recognizable standard
of conduct for the arbitrator. A hazy standard regarding impartiality
might lead the losing party to attempt to obtain a favorable court interpre-
tation. Judicial re-view of an arbitration award would appear to be sought
less often where the demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable
conduct is clear. Thus, the decision in Commonwealth should serve to
strengthen the participants' confidence in arbitration, and should decrease
further the possibility of unnecessary judicial interference in the arbitra-
tion process.
JoHN M. MURCHISON, JR.
Civil Procedure-Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies
The plaintiff, a New York resident, is injured in an automobile acci-
dent in another state. The wrongdoer, who is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in New York, is insured under a liability policy issued in the
state of his residence by an insurance company that does business in New
See generally, Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Altitude, 45 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 519 (1960) ; Comment, Commercial Arbitration: Expanding the Judicial
Role, 52 MixN. L. REv. 1218 (1968).
"' Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc.. 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d
Cir. 1967).
" F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S PIn.oso.:[v (1900).
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York. Plaintiff brings his suit in New York against the insurer,1 and
contends that the insurance policy obligations constitute an attachable res
in a quasi in rem proceeding.
2
Confronted with these facts, the New York Court of Appeals in Seider
v. Roth8 held that an automobile insurance policy issued by an out-of-state
insurer that does business in New York was an attachable debt within the
statutory definition of "debt." 4 The debt subject to attachment was found
to be the obligation of the insurance company to defend and indemnify
the assured upon the occurrence of an accident.5 This novel theory of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, which has caused both uncertainty and specula-
tion among commentators,' was followed recently by the District Court
'It would not matter that suit was brought in a federal forum, for as stated in
Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), "the amenability of a foreign
corporation to suit in a federal court in a diversity action is determined in accordance
with the law of the state where the court sits. ... ." Id. at 223.
2 For a discussion of quasi in rem jurisdiction, see H. WACHTELL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 15-16 (2d ed. 1966). The author states:
[I]f any property belonging to the defendant is within the state, such prop-
erty may be seized (levied upon) pursuant to an order of attachment, and
the property so levied upon is then deemed to constitute a "res" within the
state, permitting the court to adjudicate whether the debt claimed by plaintiff
should be satisfied out of the attached property.
Id.
, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
' See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAw §§ 5201, 6202 (McKinney 1963). Section 5201 pro-
vides:
(a) Debt against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money
judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which
is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor,
whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or
non-resident, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the
judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned
or transferred accruing within or without the state.
(b) Property against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money
judgment may be enforced against any property which could be assigned or
transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or interest and
whether or not it is vested, unless it is exempt from application to the
satisfaction of the judgment.
Id. § 5201. Section 6202 provides that debts described in section 5201 are subject
to attachment. Id. § 6202.
17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
'See Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 CORNELL L. Rnv.
1108 (1968); Note, Foreign Attachment: Attaching Liability Insurance Contract
Rights as a Means of Securing Jurisdiction of Non-Resident Defendant, 10 S.
TEx. L.J. 59 (1968); Note, Civil Procedure-The Insurance Policy of a Non-
Resident Insured May Be Subject to Attachment in New York, 18 SYRAcusE L.
REv. 631 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction--Attachment of Automobile Liability In-
surance-Insurer's Obligation Is Attachable if He Does Business Within the State,
35 U. CiN. L. REv. 691 (1966).
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for the Southern District of New York in Barker v. Smith.7
In Barker, the insurance contract was written and the accident sub-
sequently occurred in Michigan. The corporate offices of both the in-
surer and the insured were also located in Michigan. Since Michigan had
previously neither permitted the attachment procedure sanctioned in
Seider nor authorized a direct action against the insurer,' the New York
rather than the Michigan attachment procedure had to be applied to
obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. The court in Barker found that the
expenses and pain suffered by the plaintiff in New York coupled with the
fact that the insurer was doing business in New York constituted sufficient
"activities relating to the contract" to apply the New York rule treating
the policy obligations as an attachable debt."
Prior to Seider, attachment of an insurer's obligations would not
have been possible primarily because the interpretation given to the statu-
tory definition of an attachable debt in New York did not include these
obligations. Thus, a necessary prerequisite for in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction-the presence of an attachable res within the state"-had
been absent. Then, in Seider, the insurer's obligation to defend and in-
demnify the insured was held to be the attachable res. This reasoning
appears to be consistent with the rule of Harris v. Balk12 that the situs
of a debt follows the debtor and is subject to garnishment wherever the
debtor is found. That case emphasized, however, that it was dealing with
a simple debt,1" which can only be in one place at one time.14 But if the
insurance company's "debt" is found to be in New York because the in-
surance company is doing business in New York, the debt also exists in
every other jurisdiction in which the insurer is doing business. More-
over, the general rule is that an obligation subject to a condition precedent
is not attachable. 5 Yet the courts in Seider and later in Barker, finding
that certain obligations of the insurance company accrue as soon as it
'290 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).8 Louisiana and Wisconsin consider the insurer to be the real party in interest
and allow a plaintiff to sue the defendant's insurance company directly. See LA.
REv. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT. § 260.11(1) (1965).
'290 F. Supp. at 713.
20 Id.
"See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 722-23 (1878). There must also be effective seizure and adequate notice
to the owner to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction.
12198 U.S. 215 (1905).
a1 Id. at 222.
"' See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"See, e.g., 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 87 (1943).
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receives notice of an accident,' 6 held that the entire face amount of the
policy, including the insurer's contingent obligation to indemnify, was
garnishable, and thus expanded the definition of "debt" to include obliga-
tions subject to a condition precedent.
A secondary conflict-of-laws problem was encountered in the fact situ-
ations of Seider and Barker. Since an insurance policy is not an attachable
debt in Michigan, New York had to apply its laws interpreting the contract
to find an attachable res. Initially, the situs of the contract 7 was the
only relevant constitutional consideration under the territorially oriented
vested-rights theory. The Supreme Court later modified this rule when
it decided that a state with a "legitimate interest' 8 in the application of
its law may apply it without overstepping constitutional limitations, al-
though it remains unclear exactly what minimum contacts are sufficient
to result in such an interest. Although Seider disregarded the problem
of minimum contacts, the court in Barker established two prerequisites
necessary before a state can constitutionally define the contract obligations
under a liability insurance policy written beyond its borders without
interfering with the sovereignty of sister states.' 9 First, a state must have
a legitimate interest in the application of its laws, and in Barker the court
found that the interest of New York in preventing its citizens from be-
coming public charges satisfied this requirement.2 Second, activities must
have occurred within the state that are "neither too slight nor too casual
to make application of its law inconsistent with due process."'" The ex-
penses and suffering of the plaintiff and the insurer's doing business in
New York were held sufficient to satisfy this requirement. 2
The attachment procedure sanctioned by Seider seems to contain "few
1" Typical obligations accruing as soon as the insurer receives notice of the acci-
dent are obligations to investigate and to defend. See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281
F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 332 (1934). Interpreting the
contract solely by the law of the jurisdiction in which it was consumated em-
phasized the importance of the situs in which the vested contract right arose. See
Note, Direct-Action Statittes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems,
74 HARv. L. REv. 357, 387-92 (1960).
" Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 387 U.S. 66, 73 (1954). For a
recent New York application of conflict of laws theory, see Miller v. Miller, 22
N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), reviewed in Note, Conflict of
Laws-Choice-of-Laws: The Greatest Interest Rule, 47 N.C.L. REV. 407 (1969).
10290 F. Supp. at 712.
"Id. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 313, 234 N.E.2d 669, 673, 287
N.Y.S.2d 633, 639 (1967).
2 290 F. Supp. at 713.
22 Id.
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if any limiting conditions on the bringing of an action in New York. It
appears that the plaintiff need not even be a resident of New York. '
The emphasis that Barker placed on the plaintiff's suffering and medical
expenses in New York, however, may imply that mere domicile of the
plaintiff and business contacts of the insurer in the attaching state are in-
sufficient contact.24 If this implication becomes the rule, the attachment of
insurance obligations as in Seider would be limited to some extent.25
Neither Seider nor Barker attempted to resolve whether attachment
of an insurance obligation comports with due process requirements of
the fourteenth amendment. The district court in Podolsky v. Devinney
2
found that garnishment of insurance policies was violative of due process
because New York did not permit the insured to make a personal appear-
ance and defend on the merits without subjecting himself to in personam
jurisdiction and to the possibility of a judgment greater than the policy
limits. 2 7 Also found objectionable was that in the event of the insured's
default, "there is no way that the insurance company can appear to
litigate its interests. 28 In response to this decision, the New York Court
of Appeals in Simpson v. Loehmnnam 2 held that if the insured were
required to defend, in personam jurisdiction would not be extended beyond
the limits of the policy. The risk remains, however, that the insured might
refuse assistance to the insurer.
The problems arising out of the insurer's inability to defend either its
or the insured's interests result from applying the rules applicable to the
garnishment of simple debts to the attachment of insurance obligations.
Generally, the garnishee is considered as having no interest in the res
and therefore may not "set up matters which affect the defendant only."8
SPodolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 498 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
", The Supreme Court, in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294
U.S. 532 (1935), indicated that a plaintiff's domicile might have a constitutionally
supportable interest, but this case, unlike Seider and Barker, involved a plaintiff
who would otherwise have been remediless. Louisiana and Wisconsin, which allow
direct actions against insurers, do not permit suits when the accident occurred
outside of their state, possibly implying sufficient contact only when the accident
occurred within its borders. See LA. REV. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1952); Wis.
STAT. § 260.11(1) (1963).
" In a very recent case, the second circuit also implied that Seider may not
be validly applied where the state was neither the place of injury nor the plain-
tiff's residence. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1968).
" 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
27 Id. at 489.
28 Id. at 499.
2921 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
3038 C.J.S. Garnishnent § 196, at 432 (1943).
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In the application of its garnishment law, New York has held that if the
insured "chooses not to appear, any unauthorized appearance on his behalf
by attorneys retained by the insurance company would be a nullity as
against him."'" The difficulties are apparent in analogizing an insurance
policy to a simple debt, for "the obligation to defend an insured is not
to be regarded simply as a duty owed to the holder of the policy but also
as an essential right which the insurance company reserves to itself in
order to protect itself against unwarranted liability claims.""2 This prob-
lem has not been directly confronted by the New York Court of Appeals,
but dictum in Simpson v. Loehmann3 3 Would allow the insurer to use an
insured's failure to comply with the terms of the policy as a defense. It
is not certain, however, that New York will follow this position.3 4 Regard-
less of whether the defense of non-cooperation is allowed, if New York
prohibits the insurer from asserting the insured's defenses, there are
obvious opportunities for collusion. Possible collusion between the in-
surer and the insured exists if a defense of non-cooperation is permitted;
collusion opportunities between the insured and the plaintiff arise if such
defense is disallowed. In contrast, in a direct action the company can
"contest the assured's liability and raise its policy defenses since here
it does not have the option of withdrawing from the case without a com-
plete default on the merits."35
There will be additional problems if other jurisdictions adopt similar
attachment procedures. For example, if an accident occurred involving
plaintiffs who were citizens of New York and of another jurisdiction that
allowed such attachment, and the defendant's insurer was doing business
in both jurisdictions, would the debt be situated in both states at the
same time ?36 A related problem arises when attachment is levied in New
31 Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
Earl S. Peed Organ., Inc. v. Gray, 40 Misc. 2d 471, 473, 243 N.Y.S.2d 111, 113
(Sup. Ct. 1963). These cases were decided on the basis of N.Y. INs. LAW § 167
(McKinney 1966).
'
2 Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3321 N.Y.2d at 309 n.2, 234 N.E.2d at 670 n.2, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635 n.2. See
also Siegel, Simpson Upholds Seider-Problems for Both Sides, Notes and Views,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1968, at -.
" Louisiana and Massachusetts do not permit the defense of non-cooperation.
See, e.g., West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 190, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) ; MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 175, § 113A(5) (1959).
" Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Prob-
lems, 74 HARv. L. Rzv. 357, 366 (1960).
" See Note, Jurisdiction-Attachment of Automobile Liability Itsurance-
,Insurer's Obligation Is Attachable'if He Does Business Within the State, 35 U.
CIN. L. REV. 691 (1966).
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York by one of two plaintiffs injured simultaneously in a foreign juris-
diction and the other plaintiff has obtained an in personam judgment
against the defendant and seeks execution out of the attached insurance
policy.
3 7
New York is the first jurisdiction in which the highest state court
has "enacted" the equivalent of a direct action statute"' By an extremely
broad definition of a simple debt, an expanded conflicts test, an extended
jurisdiction test, and a novel use of the garnishment process, New York
has protected its residents under the guise of a quasi in rem proceeding.
Admittedly, the state of the plaintiff's residence has a definite interest in
protecting its citizens. Barker, however, dismisses the interests of the
insurer and the insured by recommending that "inconvenience or hard-
ship ... may be alleviated by way of a motion for a change of venue.''"
This statement is based on the assumption that the parties will be able
to obtain federal jurisdiction or that the forum will allow a change in
venue.40 Even though Barker allowed the attachment of the insurance
obligation, there is no necessary implication that all attachments possible
under Seider are valid. The basic issue remains a determination of
whether there are sufficient interests and contacts in New York to sustain
jurisdiction over a corporation's intangible obligations on a cause of action
arising out of state." It has been suggested that the insurance contract
See Note, Civil Procedure-The Insurance Policy of a Non-Resident In-
sured May Be Slibject to Attachment in New York, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 631
(1967).
8 See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Note, Juris-
diction-Quasi-in-Remv---Insurance-Attachment of Automobile Liability-Insurer's
Obligations to Defend and Indemnify, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. R.v. 147 (1966);
Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingewt Obligations and the Interstate
Corporation, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 550 (1967).
" 290 F. Supp. at 714. The court here employed the approach of Watson v. Em-
ployers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), which held that when "a contract
affects the people of several states, each may have interests that leave it free to
enforce its own contract policies." Id. at 73. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), the Court stated that a party who challenges
a court's choice of laws "assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational
basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are
superior to those of the forum." Id. at 547-48. While Watson may allow a state
to apply its law if it has sufficient contact regardless of the other state's interests,
Alaska Packers seems to imply a balancing of competing interests.
"' The insurer may be unable to obtain federal jurisdiction for diversity or
jurisdictional amount reasons and the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought may
not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
4' See, e.g., Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapter in Long
Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 769 (1967); Comment, Garnishment of In-
tangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLum. L.
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should be regarded merely as another contact and not the sole determinant
of jurisdiciton over an out-of-state cause of action.4" Perhaps a legislative
solution to this problem might resolve the present uncertain status of
New York attachment law.
43
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN
Civil Procedure-Serving Statement of Case on Appeal in North
Carolina-An Unfortunate Interpretation
In North Carolina two formal steps are required in appealing a
decision from a trial court. The appellant must prepare and serve to the
appellee a statement of the case on appeal, and the case must be docketed
on the appellate court's calendar in accordance with the rules of the higher
court.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-2821 allows only fifteen days to serve statement
of case on appeal and ten days thereafter for counter case or exception,
but the statute includes a proviso that gives the trial judge discretion
"to enlarge the time in which to serve statement of case on appeal and
exceptions thereto or counter statement of case."2 The statute does not
expressly authorize any subsequent extensions of time to be ordered by
the judge hearing the case. As a practical matter, however, it is some-
times impossible for the appellant to secure a copy of the transcript of
the trial and to prepare his statement within the original extension period
set by the judge. Often the delay is occasioned by an official of the court,
but the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that this does not excuse
a failure to serve the statement within the time allotted.3 Consequently, it
has been common practice for the trial judge, even without specific statu-
REv. 550 (1967); Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiciton Based on Insurer's Obligations,
19 STANFo1 L. REv. 654 (1967).
" See, e.g., Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and
the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUm. L. Rnv. 550, 567-71 (1967).
" Such a statute should at least do the following: (1) allow the insurer to set
up the defenses of the insured, (2) resolve whether the insurer can defeat an
action successfully on the insured's failure of cooperation, and (3) clearly specify
the minimum contacts in New York sufficient to attain jurisdiction.
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-282 (1953).
2 Id.
'State v. Wescott, 220 N.C. 439, 17 S.E.2d 507 (1941) (illness of the court
reporter); Rogers v. City of Asheville, 182 N.C. 596, 109 S.E. 685 (1921) (stenog-
rapher busy).
